UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN RE: APPLICATION OF CITY :

OF ALMATY FOR ORDER TO TAKE : 16-MC-623 (WFK) (JO) DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO :

28 U.S.C 1782

: January 13, 2017

: Brooklyn, New York

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TRANSCRIPT OF CIVIL CAUSE FOR ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES ORENSTEIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: ROBERT MALIONEK, ESQ.

For the Defendant: JOHN KENNEY, ESQ. JOHN CURLEY, ESQ.

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THE CLERK: Civil cause for status
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    conference, docket number 16-MC-623, In Re:
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    Application of the City of Almaty.
               Will the parties please state your
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    appearances for the record?
               MR. MALIONEK: Robert Malionek or Latham &
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 7
    Watkins for the City of Almaty.
               THE COURT: Good morning.
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               MR. MALIONEK: Good morning.
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               MR. KENNEY: John Kenney and John Curley
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    with Hoguet Newman Regal & Kenney for the RMP
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    partnerships.
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               THE COURT: Good morning. Before we get to
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    the issue of fees, I just want to confirm that the
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    discovery that was ordered has been provided.
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               MR. MALIONEK:
                             The discovery that was
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    ordered was for our 1782 application to go forward.
    Documents have been produced. We do intend to serve a
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    notice of deposition. That was part of the original
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    application that was granted.
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               THE COURT:
                           Right.
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               MR. MALIONEK: So we'll be asking for the
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    PMK depositions, we assume, of Elvira Krapanoff (ph)
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    and others but we'll be serving that soon. We're just
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    in the process of reviewing the documents first.
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1 you. All right. I take it there's no 2 THE COURT: 3 dispute about the deposition going forward? MR. KENNEY: Not at the moment. We don't 4 5 expect one. THE COURT: Very good. If anything comes up 6 7 in that regard, of course you'll let me know. get to the issue of fees. 8 Mr. Malionek, I've read the papers and I may 9 have some questions but if you want to add anything to 10 11 your submission, I'll hear you. MR. MALIONEK: I think, your Honor, I'll try 12 13 to be brief then. As you know, and we've never 14 actually had the opportunity to brief the background of 15 the case, but the City of Almaty is an interested party 16 pursuant to the criminal proceedings against the 17 Krapanoff family. Victor Krapanoff was the mayor of Almaty and his family have been accused -- warrants 18 19 have been issued for the arrest of members of his 20 They were running a criminal enterprise and 21 had stolen and then laundered perhaps 300 million dollars of funds through real estate, through U.S. 22 23 The 1782 application that we filed was our banks. 24 effort on behalf of the city to try to locate the funds that were laundered, we understand, through the RPM 25

entities that are the defendants in this action. 1 We filed the application in March. It was 2 3 granted right away. Then the motion to vacate had been It was briefed and submitted in June and then 4 in October, as you know, your Honor, a hearing was --5 the parties were asked for dates to appear for a 6 7 hearing on the 1782 application. We understood at that point that RPM's prior counsel was going to seek to 8 withdraw and then Mr. Kenney was planning to substitute 9 in. We understand that RPM, from the motion to 10 withdraw, was not paying over \$100,000 in RPM's fees. 11 At the status conference on November 17th --12 13 that was three weeks later -- we prepared our 14 presentation with respect to all issues in the case, 15 including as necessary on the motion to vacate with 16 respect to the 1782. Your order was for a principal or 17 officer of each of the RPM entities to attend. course, we prepared and they failed to appear. 18 19 issued a status conference for the next day with the 20 same instructions. Again, we prepared and they failed 21 to appear. 22 At that point, Mr. Kenney substituted in and they withdrew their motion to vacate without giving us 23 24 prior notice other than the evening before that November 18<sup>th</sup> status conference. You recognized, your

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Honor, that we were free to seek sanctions with respect to the costs incurred in the -- as caused by the failure of the principals or officers to appear as well as with respect to the litigation burdens in opposing what ultimately became an abandoned motion.

The standard under Rule 16(f) states that the Court must order a disobeying party, a party who fails to appear, to pay the reasonable costs including attorneys' fees. The burden is on the disobeying party to show that a sanction would be unjust or the conduct was substantially justified. We think that the defendants can't meet their burden here.

With respect to the conferences, the defendants' principals or officers failed to attend two consecutive status conferences, forcing the City of Almaty to incur costs related to the prep and travel, without any substantial justification. Defendants argue in their response papers that they understood the principals were not required to attend, but the Court's orders were unambiguous with respect to that. We think they could not have been more clear.

The letter that was submitted by Elvira
Krapanoff, who is the principal for RPM-Maro,
acknowledged knowing about the orders and even that
their prior counsel had instructed her three weeks

before the hearing that failing to appear wouldn't be acceptable, in all likelihood. No explanation has ever been provided by RPM U.S.A. for their failure to appear and under the rule, the sanctions include all expenses incurred because of the noncompliance, so everything flowing from the sanctionable conduct. Here, they're abandoning their motion without prior notice, forcing us to prepare, as well as their failure to appear at the status conferences.

As to the briefing, the defendants wasted the Court's time, the City of Almaty's time in litigating and preparing for a motion to vacate, including at those November status conferences that was ultimately simply abandoned. Their only explanation for doing this is that there was a ruling that came out in June in an unrelated case that the City of Almaty is not involved in. And after that ruling came out on a joinder issue, it no longer made sense, they say, to resist the subpoenas. That was in June.

They failed to explain why they neglected to tell the Court or the City of Almaty for five months that they were then planning on withdrawing their motion to vacate. They didn't say that they were planning to do so when the Court asked the parties to schedule a hearing. They didn't say they were planning

to do so when the Court scheduled the November status conferences. They didn't even say anything at the November 17<sup>th</sup> hearing, which forced the City of Almaty to incur additional costs related to the preparation. We think that for all of those reasons, they don't meet their burden of showing that an award under these circumstances would be unjust.

The second issue that the defendants take up in their papers is that the City of Almaty's fees and costs are unreasonable here. The fees and costs that we seek are less than \$100,000, \$89,000 in fact. The standard of the Second Circuit is, what would a reasonable client be willing to pay to prosecute this particular case? Here, there's no better evidence, we think, than what the defendants' own counsel's fees have been for just a portion of what the city is seeking in this case.

Prior counsel stated in their motion to withdraw that it was owed over \$100,000. That did not include the amount that they had already subtracted because of the retainer. It did not include the preparation and the attendance at the status conferences. It did not include any costs related to preparing this motion, this application seeking our costs.

It's also clear under the Second Circuit's precedent that a Rule 16 sanction and the sanctions that are allowed under this Court's inherent authority also can be used as penalties or as a deterrent. Under the Mahoney case, for example, the Court can take into account the financial situation of the disobeying parties and found that it's reasonable and particular to take into account the amount that they themselves spent for their own counsel's defense in a case.

Here, keep in mind please that the defendants are accused of participating in money laundering of hundreds of millions of dollars of the city's funds. We have started to see evidence of the documents that we've started to review.

THE COURT: One moment. Go ahead.

MR. MALIONEK: The cases that the defendants cite we think are all with respect to inapposite circumstances. They cite cases, for example, where sanction awards were reduced or attorneys' fees were reduced because the party seeking the sanctions made no effort to provide what the professional qualifications were of the attorneys that were involved. They cite to cases with respect to block billing, in which the court was unable to determine what amounts within a block bill were related to the sanctionable conduct, whereas

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here, we've already deducted and redacted out anything that is unrelated to just those fees for which we seek the sanctions. Here, we also already deducted some of the City of Almaty's costs, including -- we've deducted Mr. Schindler's return trip back to L.A. by half. haven't asked for any sanctions related to the preparation time for the November conferences that were incurred by the associates who are involved in the case. We've excluded any of the fees related to preparation for this hearing. So think for all of those reasons, a sanction is appropriate and the fees that the city are seeking and costs are reasonable. Thank you. MR. KENNEY: Thank you, your Honor. try to be brief. I realize that you've read the papers. I do have to mention a couple of things in light of the argument that was just made. Let me start with RPM's partnerships. I'm not sure that the Court is aware that these are both limited partnerships and they're designed -- and it's a fairly commonly design for banks and investment individuals and partnerships investing in other countries from the U.S. to another country,

another country to her, and that's what these are.

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They were designed to receive money from abroad and to invest in certain entities. The Moro one was for the benefit of the daughter of the Krapanoff family, who you've heard about and lives in California, has a family there and a small business and three children. None of these entitles have any staff or have done any activity in the last -- I think since 2014. the status. As to Kazakhstan, what's being left out is that Kazakhstan is run by a dictator who runs all three branches of government. Our client and other members of his family are political dissidents. The father, Victor Krapanoff, has requested political asylum in Switzerland. The Kazakhstan government, through Almaty and other entities, have brought lawsuits against this family in Los Angeles, in the Southern District of New York, with a RICO which was -- the RICO parts were just dismissed. The Los Angeles case was dismissed and is on appeal. The Latham firm is handling the Los Angeles The Boyz (ph) firm is handling the case here. That dismissal is -- they're requesting a certification to appeal. Cases have been brought in Great Britain, Switzerland. There are criminal investigations that

have been started in various places. So what we have

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is a political battle. The case in the Southern
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    District was dismissed because the RICO counts --
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               THE COURT:
                           I'm sorry to interrupt, sir, but
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    there's no political battle in this Court. It's simply
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    a matter of -- it's a very narrow issue and I have no
    intention of weighing in on who's right or wrong as
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    between the various litigants on any of the merits
    here. It's just a matter of --
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               MR. KENNEY: I was just responding --
                           Yes, and I'm not taking into
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               THE COURT:
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    account anything about the backdrop, particularly the
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    political backdrop.
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               MR. KENNEY: So far --
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               THE COURT: You can address the motion
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    that's before me, though.
               MR. KENNEY: So far as I know, your Honor,
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    only partly in the motion that (ui) responded to has
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    there been any response to that, and I just didn't want
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    to leave that on the record without any response.
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                           I'll tell you what. Anything
               THE COURT:
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    that you want to say about the political aspects of
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    this, feel free to expand the record by submitting your
    political views --
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               MR. KENNEY:
                            Sure.
               THE COURT: -- on behalf of your client in a
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separate mailing, okay? But let's address the motion here.

MR. KENNEY: I will do that, your Honor. So let me address Elvira Krapanoff. She uses her married name, as you know from the letter that you received, but we'll call her Krapanoff because it will show the connection more easily.

The proceeding here is a request for interrogatories which was ex parte and granted, as your Honor knows. The hearing that we're talking about was not, as we understood it, a hearing for oral argument. It was a status conference and it was ordered by the Court on the same day, October 27<sup>th</sup>, that the Morville firm indicated it wished to withdraw. We appeared on the 17<sup>th</sup>, frankly as a courtesy to the Court and to let you know we would represent them but we hadn't been retained at that time, so we filed our notice of appearance the following day, on the 18<sup>th</sup>.

The Court may impose sanctions for failure to appear provided there's not a reason why -- the Court isn't required to impose sanctions. We will argue in a minute that the only sanctions or fees that should be imposed are for the second day of the hearing. I'm going to put that aside just for a minute.

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In terms of Elvira Krapanoff's conduct, she
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    did know that you had issued an order on the 27th that
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    she was to appear. The circumstances are -- I think
    this is important for the Court to take into
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    consideration. Her counsel that had been representing
    her had filed a request to withdraw. Her new counsel,
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    which she -- we had spoken with her and she knew we
    were available but had not yet been retained and had
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    not yet filed a notice of appearance. In effect, she
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    didn't have any counsel. She did have counsel --
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               THE COURT:
                           I'm sorry, I cannot agree with
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    that and I'm sure you know that that's not true.
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    had --
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               MR. KENNEY: Well --
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               THE COURT: Excuse me, sir.
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               MR. KENNEY: Yeah.
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               THE COURT: She had counsel of record who
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    was seeking to withdraw.
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               MR. KENNEY: Yes.
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               THE COURT:
                           As I did then and as I always do
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    in such circumstances, I required counsel and client
    together to appear so that I can discuss the motion
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    with them. She was not without counsel.
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                            The point that I'm making is
               MR. KENNEY:
    not that she's not without counsel. She had at least
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some inability to get the legal advice that she needed, 1 and she went to another lawyer who represented her in 2 3 the Los Angeles case --THE COURT: Look, of all the aspects of the 4 motion before me --5 MR. KENNEY: Yes. 6 7 THE COURT: -- the idea that your client had an excuse for not appearing as directed at that first 8 conference is I think the least likely to persuade me. 9 10 So I encourage you to move on to other aspects but I 11 will of course hear you out. Well, I'll be brief. 12 MR. KENNEY: The point 13 that I want to make is, she did go to counsel in Los 14 Angeles. The counsel in Los Angeles did send an email 15 to Morville's firm seeking to have her appear by telephone. She says that in the letter of the 17<sup>th</sup> and 16 17 that should go to some weight at least, not as an excuse -- she says in here letter, I apologize but I 18 19 didn't intend to do this. I thought because lawyers 20 were going to appear, that there was no issue and I 21 would not have to appear. 22 THE COURT: But I can't imagine that any 23 lawyer, yourself or anyone else, would have told a 24 client or potential client, you can assume you don't need to follow this order, even without hearing from 25

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the Court. Every responsible lawyer in that
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    circumstance would say, look, I'm going to do my best
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    to get you out of this but you've got an order and
    until we get an order vacated, you need to comply.
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    That would have been your advice, certainly.
               MR. KENNEY: I don't disagree with you but I
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    am a lawyer. I know what my advice would be.
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               THE COURT:
                           Right. Look, either she was
    getting advice from lawyers or she wasn't. If she
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    wasn't, she just had an order and she had to comply.
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    If she was, I know what the advice must have been or
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    should have been. But in any event, she had an
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    obligation. I do request, most respectfully, that you
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    move on to something else because --
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               MR. KENNEY: I'm happy to.
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               THE COURT: At best, we're going to disagree
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    on this one.
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               MR. KENNEY: Yes. So I've made my point.
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               THE COURT: Yes.
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               MR. KENNEY: And I fully understand your
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    Honor, so we'll turn to costs. The order that your
    Honor issued was to have a status conference.
22
                                                    The
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    order was not to have oral argument on an outstanding
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             We understood when we read the papers
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    afterwards that your Honor wanted to have counsel and
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wanted to make sure that if you granted the motion to withdrawn, that there would be other counsel and the case would move forward. That's why we showed up in the courtroom.

The only expense that the Latham firm went to was to come back the second day, which we agree and we've told them, we'd be happy to see your costs on that and pay for that. We don't think we should be paying for and we don't think there's any connection between the failure to appear and the briefing of that motion. The motion had been presumably mostly briefed prior to the time -- the motion was fully briefed on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of June and we don't understand why somebody would go to great lengths to get the motion ready when they were appearing for a status conference and it wasn't clear who the counsel was going to be on the other side. That's why we don't think that our client should be -- that those costs should be imposed on it.

What they have is, they want \$90,000, essentially, a few dollars less than that. That's \$56,000. \$20,000 also is in preparation for that motion, which wasn't scheduled for oral argument so far as we know. Certainly, we looked at the order to see if we had substituted, if we'd have to be ready to argue the motion.

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THE COURT: None of it would have been
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    required -- there wouldn't have been a penny of these
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    costs that are at issue now if your client hadn't made
    the motion to vacate, right?
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               MR. KENNEY:
                            Sure.
                           Okay. And I take it as a legal
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               THE COURT:
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    proposition, you agree that if that motion was made for
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    purposes of delay and harassment, the fees can be
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    awarded, correct?
               MR. KENNEY: Yes, if there was a basis to
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    make such a finding.
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               THE COURT: Okay, so that's really the
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    issue. You're saying that the motion to vacate was
    made in good faith and that as of mid-June -- I forget
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    the exact date --
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               MR. KENNEY:
                           Right.
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               THE COURT: -- based on Judge Nathan's order
    in a case, in which none of the parties here is a
    party, is that correct?
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                                 Almaty is the plaintiff.
               MR. KENNEY:
                            No.
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               THE COURT:
                           In the Judge Nathan case.
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               MR. KENNEY: In the Judge Nathan case.
               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
               MR. KENNEY:
                            And Victor and Ilius (ph)
    Krapanoff are defendants, the father and brother.
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THE COURT: Okay.
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               MR. KENNEY: But not (ui).
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               THE COURT: You're saying as a result of the
    ruling in that case, your clients, who are not parties
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    there, decided that they would no longer resist
    discovery in this case.
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               MR. KENNEY:
                            No.
               THE COURT: No, okay. I misunderstood your
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    position then.
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               MR. KENNEY: What we're saying is, in part,
    that's true.
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               THE COURT: So it is true.
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               MR. KENNEY: No.
                                 That's a piece of the
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    judgment.
               That's a piece of the judgment.
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               THE COURT: But that piece of it is correct,
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    that they were resisting before.
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               MR. KENNEY: Yes.
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               THE COURT: In good faith.
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               MR. KENNEY: Yes.
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               THE COURT: And that as a result of Judge
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    Nathan's decision, they decided not to resist.
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               MR. KENNEY: As a result of Judge Nathan's
    decision joining them in that case --
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               THE COURT: Yes.
               MR. KENNEY: -- they decided that since that
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allowed third party subpoenas, for which there wouldn't
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    be the same basis to oppose as the motion to vacate, we
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    should consider that among other things as to whether
    we wanted to go ahead with the motion to vacate.
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                THE COURT:
                            When was the decision made to no
    longer resist?
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                MR. KENNEY: The decision to no longer
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    resist was discussed at great length --
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                THE COURT: When was it made, sir?
                MR. KENNEY: It was made on the 17<sup>th</sup> or 18<sup>th</sup>.
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                THE COURT: Of?
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                MR. KENNEY: Of November. I'd like to --
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                THE COURT: I'm going to ask you to pause
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    for a moment.
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                MR. KENNEY: Sure.
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                THE COURT: I want to take a look at your
    document.
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                (Pause in proceedings.)
                THE COURT: Page 2 of your letter of
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    December 29th, at the end of the third paragraph under
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21
    section heading number 2.
                MR. KENNEY: Yes.
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                THE COURT: "After the RPM entities moved to
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24
    quash here, Judge Nathan granted a joinder motion on
    June 21<sup>st</sup>, 2016 that expended the scope of the Southern
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District action and made third party discovery toward
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    the RPM entities more likely."
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               MR. KENNEY:
               THE COURT: "At that point, it no longer
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    made sense to resist the subpoenas."
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               MR. KENNEY: Yes.
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               THE COURT: But you're saying, having
    determined that at that point, it no longer made sense
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    to resist, the decision to actually stop resisting was
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    not made until November.
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               MR. KENNEY: Yes. Well, let me make clear
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    we didn't --
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               THE COURT: So your client persisted --
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               MR. KENNEY: Wait just a second.
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               THE COURT: -- in pressing a motion that no
    longer made sense for them for those five months?
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               MR. KENNEY: Well, there are a number of
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    pieces missing there. We didn't represent this client
    until November 18<sup>th</sup>, so we talked to them and we and
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    then made the decision. We knew about --
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               THE COURT:
                           I'm sorry, Mr. Kenney, but this
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    is somewhat frustrating because it seems to be moving
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    the goalpost in terms of what your client is asserting
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    as just not a reason but as to what happened.
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               MR. KENNEY:
                           Let me --
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THE COURT: And I can't resolve, I don't think, these factual issues at this point about who made the decision and when and on what basis without factually getting evidence from the clients and the attorneys who advised. I don't want to intrude on the privilege but if you're saying that it no longer made sense to resist as of June 21st but the decision to stop resisting wasn't made until November 17<sup>th</sup>, I have a lot of questions that need to be answered and among them are facts -- the absence of any indication that they would no longer resist discovery, the fact that they didn't provide the discovery in the intervening months, statements in the motion to withdraw that are wholly inconsistent with a belief that resisting the subpoena no longer made sense. Frankly, I have some real reservations about the veracity of the assertion. MR. KENNEY: Let me make a proffer if I may. THE COURT: And I need to resolve those before I can give some credit to the position you're taking. MR. KENNEY: May I make a proffer? THE COURT: You've already done so but go ahead, make some more proffers. MR. KENNEY: I'm arguing but now I'm saying if you have a hearing, this is what you'll find out.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. KENNEY: We did not get in this case and make decisions with the client until the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> of November. We are the law firm that made the decision not to go forward with the motion. There were a number of reasons that I can tell you because I was there and I had the phone calls, but I didn't have any authority and I didn't represent this client in this case between June and November, so I wasn't participating at that time and I don't know what they thought.

I'm telling you what I thought, and what I thought was, you have this other case where they can get the same stuff now. They haven't yet, maybe they wouldn't. It's costing \$100,000. We're the second firm to come into this case. Obviously, we don't want to continue along this range. Any decision made by the Court in this case was almost certainly going to be appealed no matter how it came out.

We looked at the documents or waked through the thing. We decided it was more practical to withdraw the motion and produce the documents and have the deposition than it was to go forward. We had this discussion with our client. The client agreed and that's why we suggested withdrawing the motion. We

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asked the Latham firm if they would consent. They
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    refused to consent so we came in and asked the Court if
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 3
    we could make a motion to withdraw. It had nothing to
    do with what sanctions the Court might impose.
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                THE COURT: Why didn't I hear about that in
    the first communication from your client saying, sorry,
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    I can't be there?
                MR. KENNEY: I don't recall but I think the
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    answer to that is, we hadn't fully made that decision.
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                THE COURT: But you're telling me that
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    that's the date the decision was made.
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                MR. KENNEY: Either the 17<sup>th</sup> or 18<sup>th</sup>.
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                THE COURT: I see. It's disturbingly
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    malleable, Mr. Kenney.
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                MR. KENNEY: We were discussing it, Judge.
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                THE COURT: I see.
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                MR. KENNEY: And then when we came in on the
    18<sup>th</sup>, we had decided that --
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                THE COURT: And no hint of that in the
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    letter of November 17<sup>th</sup> from your client.
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                MR. KENNEY: I wouldn't expect there would
    be.
22
                            No. All right, well --
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                THE COURT:
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                MR. KENNEY: I don't think she's going to be
    saying, we're thinking about withdrawing the motion.
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She's our client. 1 THE COURT: As far as you know -- do you 2 3 know one way or the other if your client had any such discussions with prior counsel? 4 MR. KENNEY: I don't know. 5 This is frankly, Mr. Kenney, 6 THE COURT: 7 very troubling. MR. KENNEY: I'm more than happy to answer 8 any questions the judge might have in mind to put you 9 at ease, if I can. 10 11 THE COURT: My questions are about when this 12 decision was purportedly made. 13 MR. KENNEY: Right. 14 THE COURT: Because the way it looks to me 15 right now, the only thing that seems to be consistent 16 with the objective facts on the record in terms of what 17 was said by whom and when is that the statement that we decided only on November 17<sup>th</sup> to withdraw the motion is 18 19 less plausible than the proposition that the motion to 20 vacate was made for purposes of delay and harassment, 21 because had the motion been deemed unwise or futile in June, I would expect for any number of reasons the 22 docket to look very different than it does. 23 24 questions I would want to ask are questions that need to be posed to your client, to former counsel, to 25

1 yourself under oath. We can have that here and if necessary to resolve this issue, we will. 2 MR. KENNEY: All I can tell your Honor is, I was not representing the client before the 17th of 4 5 November, so I don't know what they were thinking or their lawyers were thinking. I wasn't a participant in 6 7 that. 8 THE COURT: Of course you weren't a participant. Well, not of course. I'll take your word 9 for it that you weren't a participant. 10 11 MR. KENNEY: We knew this was going on. THE COURT: These questions I think would be 12 13 apparent to anyone looking at this record. And the 14 fact that you didn't represent your client before November 17<sup>th</sup> doesn't mean you're unable to ask her 15 about what happened before November 17<sup>th</sup>. But 16 17 apparently you have not done so and maybe there's some reason not to have done so. But in any event, if this 18 19 continues to be a controversy that I have to resolve, 20 there are questions I need to have answered because the 21 most readily apparent and most plausible explanation is one that suggests a different motive for the motion 22 than you proffered to the motion to vacate and one that 23 24 would, as you conceded, justify an award of fees for 25 litigating the motion and all of the succeeding

1 appearances. That said, I do have some concerns on the 2 3 other side about the amount of fees. We're in the Eastern District, not the Southern District, and 4 whatever the wisdom of the Second Circuit's decision in 5 Simmons saying that you have to look at Eastern 6 7 District fees in such circumstances, that is the law of the circuit. So I'm not prepared to sign off on the 8 very high fees that I know you can demand in the 9 Southern District. I don't doubt the veracity of that. 10 I'm wondering if it would make sense to take 11 12 a break while you folks discuss two things, only one of 13 which necessarily would be pertinent. One is whether 14 you can agree on a compromise that resolves this 15 entirely, the amount to be awarded. Secondly, if you 16 can't, to come up with dates for a factual hearing to 17 resolve the questions that -- the factual questions that I've discussed. Do you want to take a break to do 18 19 that now or do you want to confer with each other and 20 write back to me in a week or so? What do you quys 21 think? 22 MR. MALIONEK: I would be happy to have those discussions over the phone and get right back to 23 24 your Honor. I think that might be the most efficient. 25 THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. MALIONEK: But we of course will follow
 1
    your lead.
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 3
               Mr. Kenney, I'm sorry if you have a
    different thought.
 4
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               MR. KENNEY: I'd be more than happy to talk
    about it right now and get back to you in a few
 6
 7
    minutes, if your Honor has the time.
               THE COURT:
                           Why don't we take a break and
 8
    see if you can resolve something quickly. If not, I
 9
    don't want to put time pressure on it. I want to have
10
    considered decisions, so don't feel any pressure from
11
12
    my end to do it that way. If you both feel that you
13
    can, by all means, I'll certainly wait a few minutes.
14
               MR. MALIONEK: Your Honor, I apologize.
15
    While we're happy to talk about it right now, it will
16
    take some time to be able to then discuss it with our
17
    client. I do actually respectfully think it may make
    sense to get back to the Court a week from now.
18
19
    don't want to preclude us discussing it right now.
20
    absolutely will.
21
               THE COURT: Right. You're saying you can't
22
    reach an agreement because you need to run it your
    client.
23
24
               MR. MALIONEK:
                              Right.
                           That's understandable.
25
               THE COURT:
                                                    I'd
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understand that on either side. So why don't I expect
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 2
    a letter from you a week from today, and either you'll
 3
    tell me it's resolved or what other possibility there
    is short of resolution before we go ahead and schedule
 4
    a hearing. If you guys think you haven't resolved it
 5
    but it's not out of reach, im happy to have -- I
 6
 7
    wouldn't want to be personally involved in trying to
    sponsor settlement negotiations on it because in the
 8
 9
    absence of an agreement, I'd have to come up with a
10
    number myself. But I could refer you to court-
11
    sponsored mediation or another magistrate if that's
12
    something you all agree on.
13
               So let me know your preference and we'll
14
    take it from there.
15
               MR. MALIONEK:
                               Thank you, your Honor.
16
                           Thank you all. Have a very good
               THE COURT:
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    day.
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18	I certify that the foregoing is a correct
19	transcript from the electronic sound recording of the
20	proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
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23	Smp_
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25	ELIZABETH BARRON January 19, 2017